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ABSTRACT
Inspired by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular 
thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’ – first-
personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se – call for special 
treatment: we need to abandon one of two traditional assumptions 
on the contents needed to provide rationalizing explanations, their 
shareability or their absoluteness. Their arguments have been very 
influential; one might take them as establishing a new ‘effect’ – 
new philosophical evidence in need of being accounted for. This is 
questioned by the skeptical arguments in recent work by Cappelen 
& Dever and Magidor, along lines that a few discrepant voices had 
already announced earlier. Skeptics content that the evidence does 
not really call for revising traditional theories of content. I will discuss 
their challenges – first and foremost, concerning action explanations –  
aiming to make the case that the ‘De Se effect’ is no illusion: de se 
attitudes require us to revise one of the two tenets of traditional views.
ARTICLE HISTORY received 30 April 2016; Accepted 8 June 2016
KEYWORDS First-personal reference; de se attitudes; presupposition; singular reference; 
subjectivity; introspection
1. Preamble: the De Se ‘Effect’
Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) 
argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about 
oneself ‘as oneself’ – first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly 
called de se – call for special treatment, in a way I explain below. 
Their arguments have been very influential. If I may allow myself an 
autobiographical aside, I usually mention them as good examples 
© 2016 Informa uK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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of progress in philosophy, with the following considerations. 
Sometimes scientific progress comes not so much from advancing 
new theories as from establishing new ‘effects’ – as psychologists 
call new evidence (new relative to the evidence and views held at 
the relevant time) in need of being accounted for. New explananda 
can in fact be even more lasting than new theories. In physics, for 
instance, Archimedes’ alleged discovery that gold is soluble in aqua 
regia has survived as evidence to be explained by an adequate 
chemical theory much longer than the theories put forward to 
account for it. Similarly, although the tides were of course known 
in the eighteenth century, they were only classified as evidence 
together with other gravitational effects by Newton, and this (not 
just the tides, but the relatively theory-laden classification) has 
survived longer than his own account. Thus, having their name 
associated with a new effect, such as the McGurk effect or the 
Müller-Lyer illusion, may be something that researchers covet 
more than providing a theoretical account for it.
In philosophy, we can find illustrations of the same phenome-
non. Kripke’s (1980) rigidity data, or his Gödel–Schmidt thought 
experiment for his ‘semantic’ argument are good examples; they 
are here to stay, whatever one thinks of the different ‘direct ref-
erence’ theories purporting to account for them. For a second 
illustration, consider a footnote in that very work, in which Kripke 
(1980, 51) complains: ‘Logicians have not developed a logic of 
vagueness’. The work of Fine, Kamp, Williamson and others has 
mended this in the ensuing years. But again, I have more con-
fidence in the ‘effects’ that have been discovered through these 
debates (such as the back-and-forth intuitions regarding where 
cut-off points lie in ‘forced-March sorites’ cases, pointed out by 
Raffman (1994)), than in any of the theories advanced to explain 
them, even the one I take to be correct. In some cases (Gettier 
comes to mind) very influential philosophical ‘effects’ are made 
public without even mentioning any supporting theory.
It is against this background that I think Lewis’ and Perry’s work 
can be mentioned as a good example of progress in philosophy: 
it establishes a new ‘effect’. But this is questioned by the skeptical 
arguments in recent works such as Cappelen and Dever (2013) 
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– ‘C&D’ henceforth – and Magidor (2015).1 Let me elaborate on 
what I take to be the relevant ‘effect’ at stake in these debates. 
In order to describe explananda, we need characterizations as 
independent as possible of the extant rival theories purporting 
to account for them; we thus need a characterization compatible 
with the claims of de se skeptics, like the aforementioned authors, 
who would otherwise deny the very existence of de se attitudes. I 
suggest we adopt the sort of approach that Hill (2009, 19–22; cf. 
also Kriegel (2015, 52–53)) advances when confronting a similar 
problem – that of providing an initial characterization of what the-
ories of qualia are about, acceptable even to qualia-skeptics who 
would otherwise deny their very existence.2 Since Nagel (1974), 
philosophers have typically resorted here to ‘what it is like’ locu-
tions, but it is unclear that this turn of phrase, in its ordinary usage, 
can adequately serve the purpose.3 Hill instead introduces qualia 
as properties it is reasonable to think of as fully graspable only from 
the perspective of the conscious subject, such as pains, orgasms 
or tastes, so that such and such arguments (here specific examples 
should be provided: those in Kripke (1980) or Jackson (1986) will 
do) have been advanced to argue for their irreducibility to the 
physical. What we might call the ‘qualia effect’ is then the (relatively 
theoretical) one of making it apparent (or reasonable) that the 
mind cannot be reduced to the brain and that physicalism is false.
Similarly, let us take de se attitudes to be those typically 
expressed by means of sentences including first-personal pro-
nouns, such as (here paradigm examples should be mentioned, 
like those in Perry’s Lingens’, Heimson’s, Messy Shopper’s, and 
Lewis’s Two Gods thought-experiments), so that philosophers 
including Perry and Lewis have argued that traditional theories of 
content could not properly characterize them. By analogy with the 
previous case, what we might call the ‘De Se effect’ will be that of 
making it apparent (or reasonable) that certain attitudes lack objec-
tive contents: they lack either absolute or shareable contents (in a 
1Although (as C&D (2013) exhaustively document) most philosophers share my appraisal of 
Lewis’ and Perry’s contribution, as usual in philosophy the consensus is far from universal, 
and some of the more recent skeptics’ critical points were anticipated by, among others, 
Boër and Lycan (1981), Stalnaker (1981) and Millikan (1990).
2ninan (2016, 89–90) has a related discussion and similar proposal to the one I’ll make. The 
example of qualia is not just a convenient one; as it will become clear, phenomenal con-
sciousness plays an important role in my discussion.
3Cf. Snowdon (2010) for a good critical discussion.
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sense momentarily to be developed), so that ‘content- objectivism’ 
is false.
In Hill’s account, qualia are not said to be ‘subjective’ (fully grasp-
able only from a first-personal perspective), merely that they are 
typically thought to be so; and they are not said to be irreducible 
to physical properties – it is merely that some have argued that 
they are so, on the basis of their alleged subjectivity. Similarly, 
we do not exclude de se attitudes to have objective contents, nor 
consequently to be also expressed, even typically expressed, by 
non-first-personal sentences – nor do we assume that thinkers to 
which they occur need to express them; and we do not assume 
Lewis’s and Perry’s claims on contents to be correct. Hence, we are 
not begging any questions against the skeptics. For I take the main 
skeptical view in this area to be that these claims by Lewis and 
Perry are wrong. According to them (C&D 2013, 16; Magidor 2015, 
272), we can explain all we need to explain about propositional 
attitudes, including de se attitudes, by assigning them contents as 
traditionally understood; as the latter puts it: ‘the category of de se 
attitudes (if there is one) does not … require any special amend-
ment of our general account of propositional attitudes’ (Magidor 
2015, 272).
What are the relevant features of this traditional understanding 
of thoughts? (I am using this notion interchangeably with propo-
sitional attitude.) Perry (1979, 36) stresses two (given the assump-
tion that they have contents, propositions to which the subject 
holding the attitude is related): (i) they have absolute truth values 
(given a full description of the world, they can be assigned one), as 
opposed to having truth values only relative to subjects or times; 
and (ii) they are shareable – if constituted by concepts, these, like 
Fregean senses, can be fully grasped by different individuals. The 
conception of propositions as classes of possible worlds meets 
these conditions, and it is the explicit target of Lewis (1979, 515); 
but there are other views on propositions that also meet them, 
such as Fregean accounts. Ninan (2016, 100–102) mentions two 
considerations to explain why propositions have been tradition-
ally understood to have those two features: they allow for a nat-
ural characterization of agreement in belief (i.e. holding beliefs 
with the same contents) and the lack thereof; and they allow for 
non-vacuous generalizations when propositional attitudes such as 
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beliefs, desires, and intentions are mentioned in the explanation 
of action (ceteris paribus, all those with the same attitudes would 
act equally).
Perry’s and Lewis’s work (anticipated by Castañeda) were 
thus produced against a theoretical background that assumed 
a well-motivated account of what propositions are like, and they 
provided considerations based on ingenious examples which, 
according to them, proved these assumptions wrong. This is 
what I take to be the philosophical ‘effect’ they established, the 
De Se effect – the illustration of philosophical progress their work 
provides. It will be my main contention in this paper that it is an 
effect (so that we can safely continue to use it as an example of 
philosophical progress), not – as the critics argue – an illusion.
Perry and Lewis came up with different theories to account for 
the De Se effect. Lewis’s abandons feature (i) of traditional prop-
ositions. He takes contents to be properties instead; Sosa (1981) 
and Chisholm (1981) advanced essentially the same view. Contents 
would be entities that are true or false, given a full characterization 
of a way for the world to be, only relative to a subject and a time. 
Alternatively, the contents of propositional attitudes are, or at least 
select, not classes of worlds, but rather classes of centered worlds: 
worlds together with a designated subject and time. For its part, 
Perry’s theory abandons the second feature: we should distinguish, 
he contends, the content of a belief from the belief-state through 
which it is accessed. The content is a proposition – say, that Perry 
is making a mess. The state is a condition of the subject, by being 
in which the content is believed. Contents respond to the role 
that propositional attitudes constitutively have in appraising the 
rationality of the subject, the adequacy of his beliefs to his evi-
dence and of his actions to his beliefs and desires, the value of 
his desires, etc. But only, on Perry’s view, in a coarse-grained way: 
a full account of rational action must mention not just contents, 
but also the state through which they are accessed; and states are 
mental particulars that cannot be shared by different individuals, 
or the same at different times.
In previous work (García-Carpintero 2016a), I have questioned 
the details of Perry’s proposal, and provided an alternative one that 
is nonetheless very much in the same spirit. My main worry con-
cerned the need to explain how it is that states have by themselves 
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the capacity to contribute to rational explanations along the lines 
that contentful states do.4 Perry usually talks at this juncture about 
the different ‘classificatory practices’ we have for representational 
states/acts, relative to different purposes. He argues that states 
are mental particulars that may be classified by their ‘official con-
tents’, but also by a plurality of other finer-grained propositional 
contents, useful for different explanatory purposes. This might 
suggest an unwelcome instrumentalist stance. We would like to 
understand why de se thoughts in themselves, given the consti-
tutive features our account ascribes them, have the rationalizing 
virtues they are supposed to have.
On my proposal, summarized in Section 3 below, the appeal to 
states boils down to locating propositional attitudes in a specific 
network of other contentful attitudes, including some that cannot 
be shared. But the details of my own account of the De Se effect, 
or Perry’s and Lewis’s, do not matter here, and as suggested above 
I am much less confident about them than I am about the effect 
itself. So, this is my agenda for the rest of the paper. I will discuss 
challenges posed by the skeptics about three different issues that 
in my view help to make the case that the De Se effect is no illusion, 
first and foremost, action explanations that require de se attitudes; 
I will also mention the phenomenon of immunity to error through 
misidentification, and logophoric expressions (those which indi-
cate de se attitudes) such as PRO in natural languages. I will sketch 
considerations for my own account that I have given elsewhere in 
more detail;5 but the focus will lie in trying to provide answers to 
the skeptics, using my particular take on de se phenomena only 
to show one way (among others) in which the De Se effect might 
have come about.
2. Action explanation and the De Se effect
In the previous section, I have provided a characterization of de 
se thought neutral vis-à-vis the debates confronting believers in 
the De Se effect and deniers. Let me use henceforth ‘genuine de se 
thought’ or ‘true de se thought’ to refer to de se thoughts as they 
would be if the De Se effect were real, i.e. if a proper account of 
4Cf. also Zemach (1985, 187) for this sort of criticism.
5Cf. García-Carpintero (2016a, forthcoming).
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them should abandon either feature (i) or feature (ii) above in the 
traditional conception of the attitudes. I take the agency-based 
arguments for the essential role of first-personal thoughts (the 
famous thought-experiments involving characters such as Perry’s 
Messy Shopper, Lingens the amnesiac lost in Stanford Main Library, 
Castañeda’s amnesiac soldier reading his biography, or Lewis’s two 
gods) to offer the best considerations for the existence of the De 
Se effect, i.e. for the genuineness of the de se thoughts that figure 
in them. This section is devoted to developing this contention.
Let us focus for concreteness on Perry (1979, 33) Messy Shopper 
case:
I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my 
cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on 
the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was 
making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became 
thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I 
was the shopper I was trying to catch.
Before his epiphany, the shopper has a belief about himself (under 
the individuating concept or mode of presentation the shopper 
with the torn sack) to the effect that he is making a mess. As Perry 
notes, he might also have a de re belief about himself, on most 
current ways of elaborating this notion, to the same effect:
Suppose there were mirrors at either end of the counter so that as I 
pushed my cart down the aisle in pursuit I saw myself in the mirror. 
I take what I see to be the reflection of the messy shopper going up 
the aisle on the other side, not realizing that what I am really seeing 
is a reflection of myself.
None of this, however, is sufficient for him to have the de se belief 
that he would express in accepting ‘I am making a mess’, the one 
that leads him to rearrange the torn sack in the cart. The question 
is then whether this de se belief (which he might acquire from a 
benevolent shopper uttering to him, ‘you are making a mess’ while 
pointing to his torn sack) is a genuine de se one, as Perry argues.
Let me first outline the way I suggest that we should think of 
agency-based arguments, before going into the details. I think of 
them as modest, but nonetheless compelling causal (thought-)
experiments. Imagine, for illustration, a situation in which there is 
a standing ball, B, which starts moving after being hit by another, 
A. We believe B’s movement to have been caused by A’s hit. I take 
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this to be an ordinary application of Folk Physics, underwritten 
by (a folk version of ) Mill’s method of difference (more on this 
presently). We compare the many situations in which neither 
A’s hit nor B’s movement occurs, with the situation in which both the 
hit and the movement occur, and conclude that the hit makes the 
difference, thereby constituting the relevant causal factor of 
the movement: without it, the latter would not have occurred. 
I take this to be a straightforward ordinary application of the 
method for causal inference that Mill called Method of Difference, 
‘MD’ henceforth – his ‘second canon’, which he considered uniquely 
reliable in making such inferences (Mill 1843, iii.viii.§2).6
Similarly, we compare (consciously putting ourselves in his 
shoes) the previous condition in which the Messy Shopper lacks 
the first-personal thought – even though he might well share 
with his latter self any other de dicto and de re thoughts about 
himself, to the effect that he is making a mess – all other relevant 
folk- psychological conditions also obtaining (in particular, the 
pro- attitude to prevent sugar-spilling in supermarkets), with the 
situation in which he comes to have it (again, consciously putting 
ourselves in his shoes), and conclude (crucially appealing to our 
conscious introspective awareness of our mental states in one 
and another condition) that a genuine first-personal thought is 
a required causal factor. I take the thought-experiments to make 
plausible the general point that a true de se thought is always caus-
ally needed to obtain a folk-psychologically complete behavior 
rationalization (which, following Davidson (1963), I take to be a 
form of belief/desire causal explanation), by applying Mill’s MD 
in the causal-explanatory framework of Folk Psychology to a case 
involving a phenomenal contrast that we can consciously expe-
rience. Of course, we run the relevant causal experiments in our 
imagination; but this is neither here nor there, as we do the same 
with physical causal thought – in the way Galileo ran many of 
his celebrated ‘experiments’. And it is not unheard-of to establish 
causal claims by the methods of philosophical inquiry: witness the 
already mentioned Davidson (1963) on reasons as causes, Grice 
6We cannot go here into the thorny issue of what causal factors are, although I myself like to 
think of them in terms of laws, like Mackie’s (1974) InuS conditions: Insufficient necessary 
part of an unnecessary Sufficient nomic condition for the occurrence of the effect.
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(1961) on the causal theory of perception, or Putnam (1967) on 
mental states as functional roles.7
The two most important features of this sketch are (a) the 
appeal to Mill’s MD, and, more specifically, (b) to a case involving a 
phenomenal contrast. I will now develop these two features, trying 
to show how they help to answer the considerations in chapters 
three and four of C&D (2013) and the very similar ones in the first 
section of Magidor (2015). The messiness of the details (the several 
points at which the account can be challenged) suffices to show 
that these skeptical works are among the truly valuable ones in 
their genre, forcing us to reflect much more carefully on significant 
philosophical issues than we would otherwise have done.
I need to make a preliminary point, before going into the 
details of the two features. C&D (2013) contrast action explana-
tions involving de se attitudes with others that don’t, i.e. impersonal 
explanations (cf. Magidor 2015, 259). Thus, François might carry 
out the action whose content he would describe as that I duck 
under the table because he has the belief whose content he would 
express as I am about to be shot and the intention whose content 
he would express as that I not be shot, together with a connect-
ing instrumental belief. A corresponding impersonal explanation 
would replace ‘I’ with ‘François’ in the previous content-expressions: 
François believes that François is about to be shot, desires that 
François not be shot, which, given the connecting instrumental 
beliefs, explains the action that François ducks under the table. 
C&D then suggest that their opponent would need to defend a 
claim they call the Impersonal Incompleteness Claim, IIC: Impersonal 
action rationalizations are necessarily incomplete because of a miss-
ing indexical component.
Now, C&D acknowledge at several points in their discussion 
that IIC might be considered a red herring (op. cit., 38), and this is 
exactly what I think. As the previous outline showed, in my view 
a good defense of my main claim needs to appeal to considera-
tions based on Folk Psychology, which essentially concern rational 
beings like us, perceiving and acting in the way we do: who knows 
7Biggs & Wilson (forthcoming) convincingly argue that the use of abductive methods is com-
patible with the a priori justification of the thereby supported judgments; cf. also Bonjour 
(1998) and Peacocke (2004).
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10   M. GARCÍA-CARPINTERO
what sort of rationalizations are needed to account for the behavior 
of angels and Gods, or the beings with telekinesis powers that 
Millikan (1990, 727) invokes to make similar skeptical claims? I do 
not think we need to engage in unconstrained speculation about 
such matters. Fortunately, they (op. cit., 40) consider a more to 
the point restricted version of IIC, IIC2: as a matter of deep physical 
necessity, indexical beliefs are needed in order for human beings, con-
stituted as they are, to act. Assuming a broad notion of the physical 
on which Folk Psychological facts are part of it, this is what I’ll be 
concerned to defend – on the understanding that an ‘indexical 
belief’ is a true de se one.8
(a) For the application of Mill’s MD in the strict way he envis-
aged (Mill 1843, iii.viii.§2), we need to compare two cases meeting 
these two conditions: (i) the candidate effect occurs in the second, 
experimental condition, but not the first, control condition; while (ii) 
the circumstances of the two cases differ only with respect to one 
factor: the presence of the candidate cause in the experimental 
condition but not in the control. Now, having confidence enough 
that condition (ii) obtains in any particular case involves a huge ide-
alization (or leap of faith), which has led to a debate about whether 
MD is just an instance of Inference to the Best Explanation, IBE.9
We do not need to go into this debate here, but we’ll come 
back to it because it bears deeply on our discussion. For I take it 
that both C&D and Magidor would question the truth of (ii) in our 
cases. They grant that the examples, in particular Perry’s Messy 
Shopper, involve the comparison of two cases (the shopper before 
the epiphany – control condition – and after it – experimental 
condition) in which agents share all relevant attitudes toward 
propositions meeting the two traditional conditions of absolute-
ness and shareability, and which differ in the effect – only after 
the epiphany is the subject prepared to self-ascribe the state by 
uttering ‘I am making a mess’, to look for the torn sugar sack inside 
8On a standard way of understanding two-dimensional semantics, the distinction between 
epistemic and metaphysical necessity it allows is not itself metaphysical (García-Carpintero 
and Macià 2006): it is not that there are epistemically possible worlds that are not meta-
physically possible, or the other way around, just that we allow ourselves different epistemic 
resources (a priori or empirical) to access one or the other possibility. Likewise here: I should 
not be understood as allowing for non-folk psychological rationalizations that do not involve 
indexical beliefs, only as restricting myself to folk psychological resources in making claims 
about possible rationalizations. (Thanks to Daniel Morgan for this point.)
9Cf. Lipton (2004, 121–128), and Scholl (2015) for a good up-to-date discussion.
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
SINQ 1262003 
21 November 2016
Initial CE: XX QA: MSColl:XX QC:XX
INQUIRY  11
the cart, and so on. The application of MD to conclude that a true 
de se reason was present in the experimental condition requires, 
however, that everything else is equal – that cetera are paria. And 
this is what they reject:
Everyone agrees that the representational level gives out somewhere. 
For [this] motivation […] to be persuasive, it needs to come with some 
reason to think that it gives out at exactly the right spot: while the self 
is still involved in the representation.10 (C&D 2013, 43)
More generally, an agent will have indefinitely many third-person 
beliefs and desires about the world that don’t result in or rationalize 
action by the agent. So we need to explain which ones produce 
action and which ones don’t; we need a filtering mechanism of some 
sort. Call this ‘the Selection Problem.’ […] One way to put our basic 
point is to say that the Selection Problem is solved by identifying 
a category of actionable contents. Most likely there isn’t much 
systematic and general to say about that category. What constitutes 
actionable content for an agent will depend on the kinds of sensory 
inputs the agent has – for example, whether he moves around the 
world only with smell and taste or using sonar and sounds, eyes and 
ears and fingers, etc. It will depend on the agent’s physical setup: 
whether he has fingers, claws, a trunk, wings, feet, fins, etc. It will 
depend on whether the agent’s skills include steering cars out of 
skids or balancing plates on poles, and whether the agent’s casual 
causal reach includes having employees publish Kripke’s manuscripts 
… There has to be some part of the agent’s action-generating 
architecture that recognizes the contents as representing potential 
actions that are within actionable reach, but that doesn’t have to rise 
to the level of a belief or be represented as being within actionable 
reach. (C&D 2013, 49–51)
10note that Lewisians would agree with Cappelen and Lepore that the self is not involved in 
the causal-explanatorily significant rationalizations that these arguments are intended to 
unearth, because the crucial feature of this account of genuinely de se attitudes is that the 
self is not part of the content – it is brought to bear when the attitude is evaluated at a cir-
cumstance, exactly like the world of evaluation is under standard assumptions on contents. 
In fact, when it comes to the genuinely de se attitudes explaining the most primitive basic 
actions, Perry would agree – cf. e.g. Perry (2002). So I take it that what C&D mean here is 
that their opponents need to show that representational states give out at a point where 
genuinely de se attitudes are still involved. I find a bit annoying, from the point of view 
of scholarship, that here and in several other places C&D appear to overlook this crucial 
aspect of Lewis’s (and Perry’s) views: ‘on our view, the agent doesn’t need to be represented 
in … an adequate rationalization’, 37 – but both Perry and Lewis, to make a contrast with 
whom this remark is intended, would concur; ‘what is not trivial is that … we must represent 
ourselves in relation to the objects we engage with’, 43 – but this is not what they claim: on 
the contrary, they would agree that we mustn’t. As indicated, I assume that these are just 
infelicitous expressions, which can be simply ignored by interpreting the claims as suggested.
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12   M. GARCÍA-CARPINTERO
suppose in order to lift my hand, I must first shift my shoulder blade. 
It does not seem that I cannot intentionally lift my hand without 
also having the belief that in order to lift my hand I need to shift my 
shoulder blade: even intentional actions are ultimately achieved via 
other actions, ones that are more basic or direct, rather than being the 
result of some process of thought. (Magidor 2015, 259)
although beliefs certainly play an important role in explaining action, 
the connection between belief and action must also be mediated by 
some more hard-wired, physiological constraints. For example, sup-
pose John’s arms are paralyzed and Jane’s are not. Even if John and 
Jane share all their beliefs (or if you want, all their centered-beliefs), 
and Jane’s beliefs lead her to lift her arm, those same beliefs will not 
lead John to lift his arm – simply because he is unable to. Similarly, 
while Jack’s beliefs can lead Jack to lift his legs and flee the scene, Jill’s 
beliefs cannot lead her to lift Jack’s legs (at least not in the same man-
ner), simply because she is physiologically unable to do so. (Magidor 
2015, 262)
The objection is prima facie well taken: we can never be certain 
that the second condition in any application of MD obtains – the 
so-called ‘multiple differences’ problem (Lipton 2004, 128; Scholl 
2015, §3). In particular, in cases involving rationalizations it may 
well be that MD cannot be applied to derive the intended inference 
because cetera are not paria, i.e. because some of those non-rep-
resentational conditions also required for the production of the 
effect (such as the ones in the examples that Magidor considers) 
differ. To put it using C&D’s Action Inventory Model (op. cit., 50) out-
lined in the quotation above, it might well be that the difference 
between the messy shopper before and after the epiphany has just 
to do with the fact that the relevant behaviors were not actionable 
before and have come to be so afterward (i.e. to be in the ‘inven-
tory’), while this does not involve any change in the attitudes.
In his highly illuminating piece on the skeptical arguments, 
Ninan (2016, 106–107) discusses and rejects this objection with 
considerations that I do not find convincing; this becomes clearer 
when we assume that the arguments at stake essentially appeal to 
Mill’s MD. In order to appreciate the role of this first main feature 
of my proposal, it will be helpful to stop for a moment to critically 
discuss Ninan’s otherwise similar one.
Ninan focuses on the fact that, consistent with their devotion 
to impersonal explanations, C&D typically discuss the explanation 
of actions with agent-specific contents such as François’s action 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
40 
SINQ 1262003 
21 November 2016
Initial CE: XX QA: MSColl:XX QC:XX
INQUIRY  13
of ducking under the table. Instead of focusing on the Messy 
Shopper case, Ninan considers examples involving two subjects, as 
in another example of Perry’s in which someone (‘DN’) is attacked 
by a bear and a friend is trying to help. Here, the relevant differ-
ences in actions to be explained involve DN’s disposition to utter ‘I 
am attacked by a bear’, which the friend lacks, or DN’s disposition 
to curling up, which again the friend lacks. Ninan grants that, if 
the goal is to explain why DN carries out the agent-specific action 
type that DN curls up, while the friend doesn’t, C&D’s claim that 
the explanation is not intentional, but has just to do with the fact 
that that action is actionable for DN (i.e. in his ‘action inventory’) 
but not for the friend is plausible. But on his view this is only so 
because the friend is not able to perform that action, in the circum-
stances. What about agent-neutral action types, such as the action 
of curling up, Ninan asks? He argues that we also explain instances 
of action types like this, and that C&D need to acknowledge this, 
but that their account would be implausible in this case. For, while 
the action type that DN curls up is intuitively available at the time 
to DN but not to the friend, the action of curling up is available to 
both, because both are able to perform it.
But consider again the Messy Shopper case, or any other 
thought-experiment involving just one subject. There the differ-
ence between agent-specific and agent-neutral characterizations 
of the action to be explained is irrelevant, because the agent is one 
and the same; both the action that the shopper looks into the cart, 
and that of looking into the cart, are ones that the shopper is able 
to do, both before and after the epiphany, and in that sense they 
are both available to him. So the intuitive idea of what ‘agents can 
do’ is not what is behind C&D’s notion of ‘actionable contents’ in an 
‘action inventory’, because they are providing the same account 
also for these cases: they want to say, I assume, that both those 
actions come to be in the inventory of the shopper after the epiph-
any, but were not there before.
What is truly behind C&D’s model is made clear when we bear 
in mind the ‘multiple differences’ difficulty in applying Mill’s MD: 
what they are invoking in their behalf is the plain fact that many 
other things, in addition to attitudes, contribute to causing the 
actions explained by means of them in rationalizations. As C&D put 
it in the first quotation above, ‘the representational level gives out 
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somewhere’; or, as Magidor says, ‘the connection between belief 
and action must also be mediated by some more hard-wired, phys-
iological constraints’. The account of why an action is produced 
in one case but not the other, in spite of the fact that it could in 
principle receive a rationalizing explanation (‘the subject is capable 
of doing it’) in both, and all relevant attitudes are present in both, 
might just have to do with some of those other, non-intentional 
conditions. What C&D suggest about the Messy Shopper case is, 
as indicated, that both the agent-specific action that the shopper 
looks into the cart, and the agent-neutral action of looking into 
the cart, are actionable (i.e. in the inventory) after the epiphany 
but not before, in spite of the fact that the shopper is ‘capable’ 
of doing both of them at the two times. Why? They do not think 
that they need to answer this; which other non-intentional con-
ditions should be in place for an action to be in the inventory, as 
C&D say in the quotation provided above, is a messy affair about 
which nothing systematic or general can be said, at least not at the 
present state of knowledge. Like Ninan, I think there is something 
fishy here, but I do not think he put his finger on what it is. I’ll come 
back to what I take it to be after I elaborate on the second crucial 
feature of my response to their challenge.
(b) In my view, it matters very much that the contrast that 
the thought-experiments highlight is a phenomenal one. C&D’s 
and Magidor’s point is in general well taken, and relevant to the 
argumentative structure of the thought-experiments – in my 
reconstruction, an appeal to Mill’s MD. However, their prima facie 
well-taken alternative suggestion is implausible in these cases, 
because they are also designed to show that the relevant differ-
ence is one of which the subject (and we with her, in our imagi-
native recreation of the episode) is consciously aware. This is what 
the epiphany is, in the Messy Shopper case (and in all others): it is 
a conscious realization. So this is the second feature of my elabo-
ration of the cases: they are not just appeals to Mill’s MD, but they 
are also ‘phenomenal contrast’ arguments.
A famous example of these arguments is the appeal to the con-
trast between listening to speech in a given language with and 
without understanding of what is being said (cf. Kriegel (2015, 30) 
and Chudnoff (2015, 1–2) for further examples and references). 
The contrasts are put to different uses, prominent among which 
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is that of establishing that there is a proprietary phenomenology to 
cognitive attitudes such as considering, realizing, or judging. This 
is a controversial issue, regarding which we do not need to take 
a stand.11 It only matters for our purposes that there is a cogni-
tive phenomenal contrast between the two cases involved in all 
thought-experiments, whether or not their phenomenal character 
is proprietarily cognitive.
Putting together the two strands in my reconstruction, this is 
what I take to be the shape of the arguments that establish the 
De Se effect by invoking the thought-experiments:
(1)   There is a causally significant difference between the 
two cases.
(2)   There is no difference in mental states individuated by 
absolute and shareable contents according to tradition.
(3)   The only differential factor in the two cases is the phe-
nomenally accessible presence and absence, respec-
tively, of a de se thought.
∴   The differential causal factor is a genuinely de se thought.
In order to justify the third premise, it will be useful to adopt a 
proposal made by Chudnoff (2015, 17–18). He defends a type of 
phenomenal contrast argument for the irreducibility of cognitive 
phenomenology that he describes as ‘glossed’, in that the crucial 
premise establishing the phenomenal contrast includes a gloss on 
what the contrast is. It does not merely claim that there is a contrast, 
but, say, one such that the subject becomes aware of an abstract 
state of affairs. Our cases of phenomenal contrast could similarly 
be glossed, in this way: the distinctive thought the shopper has 
after the epiphany is about himself. This gloss links the appeal to 
a phenomenal contrast with another debate to which such cases 
are put, that about the relations between phenomenal character 
11For the record, I am convinced by arguments such as the ones given in the works just men-
tioned, my own epiphany about this came through the combination of a particular example 
of phenomenal contrast I had found puzzling for a while, and the arguments in Marta Jorba’s 
2013 dissertation Cognitive Phenomenology: A Non-Reductive Account. The example is 
what we might call the ‘Euro effect’ – the difference in your impression of the value of an 
ordinary object such as a meal (in a cheap–expensive scale) measured in a given currency 
before and after you have become familiar with it, a process people went through when 
the Euro was introduced. (Which one experiences also when one travels to a country with 
a different currency, or comes to be familiar with the ‘significance’ of large amounts in one’s 
own currency.).
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
SINQ 1262003 
21 November 2016
Initial CE: XX QA: MSColl:XX QC:XX
16   M. GARCÍA-CARPINTERO
and intentionality. In particular, there is a debate concerning the 
claim that Chudnoff (op. cit., 8) calls Phenomenal Intentionality: 
the intentionality of some states is grounded on (or determined 
by, or supervene on) their phenomenal features.12 This is a claim I 
find compelling, but once more we do not need to take a stand on 
it; we only need to assume something less controversial, namely 
that some aspects of what one is phenomenally aware of are inten-
tional properties of the states, such as what they are about. So the 
difference-making thought of which we are phenomenally aware 
is also first personal in this phenomenal sense, in addition to being 
so in the (neutral) sense introduced in the previous section and 
invoked in the argument. This gloss thus elaborates on the specific 
nature of the contrast that (3) claims to exist, and helps thereby 
establishing the conclusion by an application of MD.
C&D consider a much less developed version of this 
reconstruction of the arguments (op. cit., 41–42), and complain 
that a particular case cannot establish a general necessity claim 
such as IIC2:
this is at best super-weak inductive support for a strong thesis such as 
IIC. Without further argument, this won’t justify a necessity claim like 
[IIC2]. That an ignorance of the kind the agent starts out with in Perry’s 
examples can block rationalization of agency, doesn’t show that it has 
to. Cases can be used as counterexamples to universal claims, but 
can’t be used to (deductively) establish the latter.
This overlooks the abductive strength that I am suggesting the 
experiments have, for they are designed to help us convince our-
selves that we could easily recreate them in any particular case 
amenable to folk psychological explanation.13 Thus, consider C&D’s 
impersonal explanation above of François’s action of ducking. It 
is obviously not sufficient. It overlooks that in the ordinary cases 
we are led to imagine in which François carries out the action, he 
would have (as we are aware of, by putting ourselves in his shoes) 
the first-personal believe I am about to be shot. And it is essential 
that he does have it, to properly explain the action. Because, once 
more, we can imaginatively compare two cases in both of which 
François has the relevant impersonal beliefs and desires, but only 
12Cf. Smithies (2013) for a good presentation of the debate, and Horgan and Graham (2012) 
for an interesting application.
13As indicated above, I agree with Biggs & Wilson, Bonjour (1998) and Peacocke (2004) that 
reliance on abduction does not deprive the justification for a claim of its a priori character.
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in one of which he ducks – because, intuitively put, only in one 
does he believe that he is François, i.e. has relevant attitudes about 
himself as such.
C&D and Magidor might still insist on the ‘multiple differences’ 
point: for all we know, it might be that what explains the differential 
effects in the two cases is some or other independent difference, in 
our case a non-intentional one, different in different cases. But this is 
what tobacco companies take refuge in about the experiments pur-
portedly showing that nicotine causes cancer, and it is as irrational: 
this is what, I believe, we find fishy in the skeptics’ suggestions. There 
are different proposals in the literature to elaborate on the nature 
of this irrationality – i.e. on why MD is a good inferential procedure, 
when adequately applied. Mill himself (1843, III.VIII.§3) suggested 
that the clue lies in the intervention involved in the experimental 
condition. Lipton (2004, 128) doesn’t find this sufficient, and insist 
that we need to appeal to what he takes to be the crucial virtues 
of the explanations we find best in invoking IBE, what he calls their 
‘loveliness’: in our case, the intentional explanation makes the effect 
understandable, provides a precise mechanism through which the 
effect is produced, unifying it with related cases. Scholl (2015, 98), 
in defense of the virtues of MD independently of IBE, suggests that 
the clue lies instead on the comparison, in a sufficient number of 
cases, between the control and the experimental condition: if there 
were other relevant causal factors, they would now and then show 
up in the control situation, producing in those cases the effect. As 
I said, this is not the place to adjudicate between these proposals. 
It is enough for my purposes to view the thought experiments as 
forceful applications of MD, thereby putting the skeptics in com-
pany bad enough for their points to loose the strength they might 
otherwise have thought to have.14
14To be fair, a full defense of the De Se effect would need to consider everything relevant to 
evaluate the explanations. C&D would insist that reliance on objective contents has great 
merits that we relinquish to our peril in abandoning them. They would be obviously right: 
we need an alternative account of communication to the simple one that it is just transmis-
sion of thoughts (this is what most of the papers in García-Carpintero and Torre (2016) deal 
with), of disagreement, and more in general of validity and other logical relations. I take 
the skeptics’ views here to be close to Williamson’s on epistemicism about vagueness: they 
prefer to posit mysteries (unknown, perhaps unknowable variegated action explanations; 
unknowable cut-off points) for the sake of preserving the strengths of the semantic tradition, 
classical logic included. I feel more committed to what I take to be pieces of evidence like 
the De Se effect than to theoretical assumptions whose standing I find shakier (such as the 
semantic tradition), but I admit that it is unfair rhetoric on my part to classify the skeptics’ 
views together with straightforwardly irrational attitudes about causal inference.
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Skeptics might instead reconsider their acceptance of premise 
(2). This is what another strand in their considerations suggests, 
the ‘these are just Frege cases’ point, cf. C&D (2013), Magidor (2015, 
258, 265). I’ll go into this a little further in the next section; the 
basic point I make there is this: given what we have established, 
they are ‘Frege cases’ which differ from other such cases in a crucial 
respect: while the other cases by themselves do not establish the 
De Se effect (i.e. they fail to establish that the relevant Fregean 
thoughts violate one of the two traditional conditions, absolute-
ness and shareability), these do establish it. Nothing in what C&D 
or Magidor say alters this, as far as I can tell.15
3. The wider picture: accounts of the De Se effect
This concludes my defense of the position that the De Se effect 
is real against the skeptical claims that it is only an enticing illu-
sion. The claim might, however, be bolstered if we have some idea 
of how the effect comes about and what sort of account might 
explain it, whether or not we believe the explanation. With this 
goal in mind, I will now outline my own views.
Of course, there is a familiar model that does purport to explain 
the De Se effect, namely, Lewis (1979) account that abandons the 
absoluteness of traditional contents by taking them to be prop-
erties, or sets of centered worlds. Now, as anticipated, I myself do 
not think this is the best account; but this is not the problem that 
drives me here, because choosing among theoretical accounts of 
the De Se effect (as in any other interesting case) will be a holistic 
15Although the main lines of my take on skepticism about the action explanation arguments 
for genuine de se thoughts were articulated in discussions with C&D with the occasion 
of the course they gave at LOGOS based on the book in June 2014, and some aspects of 
it featured in the ensuing debates in the LOGOS blog, http://www.theblogos.net/, ninan 
(2016) has greatly helped me to shape it. I disagree with some of the concessions he makes 
to C&D, and with part of his own proposal, as indicated above. (The fact that purported 
rebuttals of de se skeptics disagree so much with each other is further proof that this is 
skepticism worth taking seriously.) My suggestions are closer to Torre’s (ms), who like me 
considers cases in which the two actions are equally available to the two subjects (or to the 
subject at different times), and claims that it is differences in what they are aware of that are 
explanatorily relevant. Still, he would need to deal with C&D’s (op. cit., 51–52) related point: 
‘Sometimes the actionable contents are represented as being within actionable reach, the 
agent believes that they are, but in those cases they are representations of the relationship 
between the agent and the actionable content. The agent doesn’t have to think of him- or 
herself, the actionable content or the relation between him- or herself and the content in 
any special way’. A fully convincing reply needs, I think, the appeal to phenomenal contrast 
in the framework of MD in the way I have suggested.
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affair, involving considerations about many (perhaps at first sight 
unrelated) issues, something in any case beyond what I can sen-
sibly aim to achieve in this piece. What is relevant is that, in spite 
of the efforts of some Lewisians (Recanati 2007 in particular), I 
do not think that this view helps with the task just set up for this 
section – i.e. to help bolster the main claim of this paper.
Possible worlds propositions need to be considered as semantic 
values among a plurality of others in semantic and psychoseman-
tic theories, just like extensions, because a compositional account 
of the contribution of some operators depends on them. Hence, 
even if we opt for a finer-grained view of contents, we should still 
countenance related possible worlds propositions. This aside, for a 
good formal account that is technically convenient for many of the 
needs we have when devising adequate compositional theories in 
the semantics of natural language, possible worlds propositions 
currently offer the best deal. Given the arguments in the previous 
section, we should thus accept Lewis’s suggestions that it is sets of 
centered worlds and not just worlds that we should thereby take 
into consideration.16 But I do not believe that thinking of contents 
in this way helps us to understand why first-personal contents are 
not to be adequately modeled with traditional propositions – why 
they are unable to capture first-personal ‘perspectives’.
Let me then outline the Perrian account I have provided else-
where (García-Carpintero 2016a), referring the reader there for 
details, arguments, and further references. The main problem 
with Perry’s own account mentioned above was this. The appeal 
to states, in contrast to contents, cannot put aside contents alto-
gether, because rationalizing explanation is essentially explanation 
in terms of contents. For one thing, rationalizing states constitu-
tively stand in logical relations: entailment, contradiction, and so 
on; the simple account of disagreement that Ninan (2016) men-
tions in favor of the traditional account of propositions is just a par-
ticular case of this. As Perry himself and many others have pointed 
out, contents represent those relations in the way numbers model 
the relations between quantitative properties that we measure 
16See nonetheless Moss’s (2012) proposal on how to stick to traditional possible world prop-
ositions, even acknowledging the force of the previous point, which fits nicely with the 
presuppositional view outlined below. (According to her, traditional possible world propo-
sitions are still adequate to model contents, conditional on what we know with certainty.)
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by means of them. Perry is not insensitive to this fact, because 
he ultimately characterizes the relevant rationalizing properties 
of states by ascribing to them contents in addition to the ones 
he officially counts as such. The problem with his proposal lies in 
properly understanding the relationship between the official con-
tent of a given state, and the unofficial ones also correlated with 
it that help provide the significant rationalization in first-personal 
cases. It is at this point that Perry typically resorts to the unhelpful 
instrumentalist-sounding considerations I questioned above.
My own Perrian proposal has two ingredients that are relevant 
for present concerns: a quotational acquaintance account of intro-
spection of conscious states’ phenomenal features, wedded to a 
demonstrative account of quotation, and a token-reflexive presup-
positional account of indexicals in general and demonstratives in 
particular. I’ll outline them, in reverse order.
(i) Indexicals, token-reflexivity and presuppositions. In order to 
properly understand the interrelations between the two contents, 
I have resorted to the not just analogous but in my view straight-
forwardly related case of the relation between the contents of 
assertions and other speech acts and the contents of the ancillary 
presuppositions we sometimes express in making them. Although 
the states of information we end up in by accepting that ‘John 
stole the camera’ and ‘it was John who stole the camera’ are the 
same, these two sentences pack the information they convey in 
different ways. The second, cleft sentence presupposes that some-
one stole the camera, but the former, plainer sentence does not. 
For present purposes, we can think of presuppositions along the 
well-known lines that Stalnaker (1978) has suggested.17 Speech 
acts like assertions take place relative to a common ground, a set 
of already accepted propositions. Linguistic presuppositions are 
requirements on the common ground, whose satisfaction should 
be checked at an ideal time just after the utterance is made 
(because it might well be that it is the utterance itself that gener-
ates the common ground information that satisfies them: see the 
next paragraph), but before acceptance of the resulting assertion 
17My own views, although strongly influenced by him, differ at some points (cf. García-
Carpintero 2016b). I take presupposing and referring to be ancillary speech acts, and I think 
of such acts as constitutively normative; in particular, I think of presuppositions as constituted 
by normative requirements that their contents are already common knowledge. I also think 
that some linguistic presuppositions are semantically triggered.
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is assessed. If accepted, it goes to conform the common ground, 
licensing further presuppositions in the ensuing discourse. The 
difference between our two sentences lies in the fact that an 
utterance of the it-cleft sentence will feel inappropriate at pre-
supposition evaluation time if it is not common ground by then 
that someone stole the camera. But the state of information we 
move to by accepting either will be the same.
Consider an utterance of ‘he is hungry’. My view agrees with 
direct reference theorists such as Kaplan (1989) that the asserted 
content is a singular proposition, x is hungry, for some contextual 
assignment to x. It is expressed, however, in a context in which 
another singular proposition is presupposed – in this case, one 
semantically triggered by something akin to a Kaplanian character 
for ‘he’ – which, Kaplan’s invectives notwithstanding, we should 
grasp in token-reflexive terms thus: x is the male picked out by the 
demonstration associated with he, where the bold-faced ‘he’ refers 
to the relevant token. These semantically triggered presupposi-
tions are about linguistic expressions – reflexively about tokens of 
the very linguistic expressions conveying them.18 They will typically 
be supplemented by further pragmatic presuppositions, specify-
ing additional features of the demonstrated referent, perceptually 
accessible or accessible from previous discourse. (These presuppo-
sitions illustrate the point made in the previous paragraph about 
the time at which presuppositions are to be appraised.)
In the proposal I am outlining, a distinction like this between 
presupposition and other speech acts to which they are ancil-
lary obtains in the mental realm too, in the shape of a distinction 
between occurrent mental states such as judgments and inten-
tions, and relevant background beliefs. In what ways are they rel-
evant? They would be relevant for the appraisal of the main states 
vis-à-vis their constitutive norms. In the case of judgments, they 
would be relevant for the doxastic justification of the beliefs they 
manifest.19
18They are de lingua beliefs, as explained by Fiengo and May (2006, 86), exactly like their 
assignments. Proposals along these lines are quite standard nowadays in the linguistic 
semantics literature; cf. Maier (2016), where, like here, they are extended to the mental realm.
19Doxastic justifications are reasons why one has the beliefs one does; propositional justi-
fication, reasons for which one’s beliefs would be justified, if one were to form them in a 
non-deviant way on their basis.
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(ii) Gertler (2012, 99) defines acquaintance views of introspec-
tion thus: some introspective knowledge consists in judgments 
that (1) are directly tied to their truthmakers; (2) depend, for their 
justification, only on the subject’s conscious states at the time 
of the judgment; and (3) are more strongly justified than any 
empirical judgments that do not meet conditions (1) and (2). The 
directness in (1) consists in that ‘metaphysical reality and the epis-
temic intersect’ in such judgments, a metaphor that she (op. cit., 
104–109) elaborates thus. First, the relevant mental features (a 
phenomenal type, an instance thereof ) constitutively (not merely 
causally) contribute to the content of the judgment: the judgment 
is about them in virtue of a direct, constitutive relation between 
the mental reality and the phenomenal judgment. Second, the 
way things epistemically seem to the subject is constituted by the 
way they phenomenally seem to her.
On some more specific versions of this sort of view (cf. 
Papineau 2007, 120–124), the model is elaborated along quo-
tational lines, assuming a demonstrative view of quotation 
(García-Carpintero 2004). On the latter views, quotation marks 
are demonstrative expressions, and the material quoted inside 
them plays the role of a demonstratum; the referent is something 
saliently related to it. Now, as suggested above, when the messy 
shopper after the epiphany makes the judgment that he would 
express by uttering ‘I am making a mess’, he is consciously aware 
of his thought being about himself. He is thereby consciously 
aware of a feature of the representing state he is in: its having a 
first-personal character. The referent of the first-personal concept 
in it is fixed by a token-reflexive rule analogous to the linguis-
tic rule for ‘I’, which we could articulate as follows: the subject 
of the thought with this first-personal phenomenal feature. When 
the shopper makes the epiphanic judgment that his acceptance 
of ‘I am making a mess’ expresses, he is on this view judging a 
singular content, x is making a mess, with him assigned to x, and 
he is presupposing (in the indicated sense, i.e. as a background 
belief of his, relevant for the epistemic evaluation of the judg-
ment) another singular proposition about him, to the effect that 
he meets that condition.
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This raises all sorts of issues (say, about its being too 
intellectualistic an account of the involved states) that I will not 
address here.20 I just hope that the outline makes it clear why the 
view rejects the shareability condition on traditional propositions, 
constituting a (hopefully mild) version of ‘limited accessibility’ 
conceptions of de se contents, such as Frege’s own. For the 
presupposed material constitutively includes a feature of the very 
thought of whose content it is a part. Structurally, the account of 
Frege cases (the fact that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’, ‘Superman’ 
and ‘Clark Kent’, cannot be respectively substituted salva veritate 
by one another in some sentences) would be exactly parallel, so 
the skeptics are right that the cases invoked in arguments for the 
De Se effect are ‘just Frege cases’. But they are special, in that they 
motivate abandoning the shareability of contents in a way that, 
by themselves, other cases don’t.
This concludes my defense that the De Se effect is genuine, here 
to stand. A full reply to the skeptics would require going into other 
relevant issues they tackle, but their discussion of the action expla-
nation cases is in my view the crucial one. I have addressed some 
of them elsewhere. Thus, I agree with Peacocke (2014, Chapters 5 
and 6) that an adequate account of the first person should explain 
epistemic phenomena such as the Cartesian cogito (the particular 
privilege of judgments such as I exist) and immunity to error through 
misidentification. The latter is the apparent datum that, on the one 
hand, when we judge I once was in Athens on the basis of a picture 
of what we take to be ourselves in the Acropolis, our evidence is 
such that it could still justify the existential ‘part’ of our judgment, 
that someone was in Athens, even if we were wrong that that was us 
in Athens; while, on the other, this scission cannot occur when we 
judge the same on the basis of our first-personal, episodic mem-
ories. García-Carpintero (forthcoming) marshals the account just 
outlined to this task, answering in passing skeptical objections 
20See Guillot (2016) for a nice critical discussion. As I emphasized in my previous work (cf. 
García-Carpintero, forthcoming, fn. 35) my account of the de se is ‘two-tiered’ in the sense 
of O’Brien (2007, 65), or ‘hybrid’ in her sense. Deploying representations whose significance 
is captured by the self-reference token-reflexive rule is a necessary but insufficient part of 
what thinking (and talking) about oneself as such is. The full account involves in addition 
a direct awareness of one’s own states, a self-knowledge that is not itself explained by the 
reliance on the self-reference rule. I am indebted to many discussions with Marie on this 
and other points.
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by C&D and Magidor. Similarly, linguists have contended that 
Castañeda (1968) was right after all that there are in natural lan-
guages ‘logophors’, i.e. expressions used to indicate specifically de 
se ascriptions, although not the ones that Castañeda envisaged; 
this would be ‘big PRO’ uses such as the implicit subject of the 
infinitival clause in ascriptions of attitudes like ‘he expects to win 
the election’, in contrast with ‘he expects that he (himself ) wins the 
election’ (cf. Schlenker 2011). Both C&D and Magidor question this 
by offering examples in which these constructions are not used in 
a de se way. However, one can reply in defense of the additional 
indirect support that the existence of logophors would provide for 
the claim in this paper, as I have done (García-Carpintero 2015, §2), 
that their examples have purely ‘pragmatic’ explanations.21
A full vindication of the well standing of the De Se effect could 
hence only come from a global account of all the related phe-
nomena that acknowledges it and can be defended as the best 
overall.22 I hope I have said enough to somehow reassure those 
whose confidence in the De Se effect was shaken by recent skep-
tical arguments, in spite of the power that I grant they have.
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21Thus, Magidor (op. cit., 274) offers an example in which ‘Jack wants to be given some water’ 
sounds adequate even if it does not report a de se attitude. (Jack is in a hospital bed, one of 
five marked one to five; unbeknownst to him, he occupies number five. On a screen he sees 
live footage of the beds, including the numbers; he notices that patient in bed five urgently 
needs water (without realizing that it is he himself ), and shouts ‘Water for bed number five, 
please!’. A nurse then makes the report. However, to the extent that we share the intuition 
that the report is adequate, we could explain it in that ‘want’ is not then used to report a 
propositional attitude, but with the sense of ‘being in need of’.
22A full account of this kind would need to address the very interesting points in Section 3 
of Magidor’s paper, where she critically examines the broader ‘descriptivist’ picture of the 
attitudes in which Lewis (1979) frames his own account. My own views are very close to 
Lewis’s here; in fact my preference for the alternative Perrian framework to vindicate the de 
se derives precisely from how they both handle the wider picture, so I think we definitely 
need to confront the points she makes.
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